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Abstrat The problem of onstruting the Dynami Nash Bargaining So-
lution in a 2-stage game is studied. In eah stage, a minimum ost spanning
tree game is played, all players selet strategy proles to onstrut graphs
in the stage game. At the seond stage, players may hange the graph using
strategy proles with transition probabilities, whih deided by players in
the rst stage. The players' ooperative behavior is onsidered. As solution
the Dynami Nash Bargaining Solution is proposed. A theorem is proved to
allow the Dynami Nash Bargaining Solution to be time-onsistent.
Keywords: Dynami Nash Bargaining, dynami game, minimum ost span-
ning tree.
1. The Model
In the paper, we onsider a 2-stage game with spanning tree.
* H = (Z, F ) is a nite game tree with the initial vertex z1.
* Z is a set of vertexes in the game tree.
* F (z1) is a point-to-set mapping: F (z1) ⊂ Z.
* In the seond stage, F (z1) is the set of vertexes on the tree-like graph.
*i.e. F (z1) = Z \ {z1}.
* m(z1) is the number of elements in the set F (z1).
* Γ (z1) is the game starting from initial vertex z1.
* Similarly, Γ (zk) is the subgame starting from the vertex zk ∈ F (z1).
* N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a nite set of players.
* N ′ = N ∪ {0}. {0} is the soure.
* G(N ′, E) = {(i, j) : ∀i, j ∈ N ′} is a graph over N ′.
* E is the set of all edges.
* If ∃(i1, i2),(i2, i3), . . . , (in−1, in), suh that (ik, ik+1) ∈ G(N ′, E), 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1,
and i1 = i, in = j, then two vertexes i and j ∈ N ′ are said to be onneted in G.
* If all i, j are onneted in G, a graph G is alled onneted over N ′, ∀i, j ∈ N ′.
* GN ′ is the set of onneted graphs over N ′.
Denition 1. The ost of onnetions is represented by a ost matrix (Li, 2016)
Cm = (cij)(n+1)×(n+1), (1)
where cij = cji > 0 is the ost of onneting i and j, i 6= j ∈ N ′. In the paper,
ci0 = c0i is a nonnegative onstant, and ost matries are nonnegative, symmetri.
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Denition 2. At eah stage, player i hooses a vetor
xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,i−1, xi,i+1, . . . , xi,n),
where xi,j ∈ Xi,j is a strategy of player i against player j. Similarly, xj,i ∈ Xj,i
is a strategy of player j against player i. At dierent stages, the set Xi,j may be
dierent for the player i, ∀i, j ∈ N
Denition 3. At eah stage, the ost of edge (i, j) is dened as
cij = cji = fc(xi,j , xj,i), ci0 = c0i > 0, ∀i, j ∈ N. (2)
where funtion fc is a mapping from strategies of players i, j to the set R
+ ∪{+∞}
- the set of all possible ost of edge (i, j).
Denition 4. Tx(N
′, Cm) is the minimum ost spanning tree (m..s.t.) (Bird, 1976)
over N ′
Tx(N





where Cm = (cij)(n+1)×(n+1) is the ost matrix.
Denition 5. C[Tx(N








2. Desription of the Game
2.1. Stage 1




1(z1), . . . , x
1
n(z1)),
x1i (z1) = (x
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where x1i,j(z1) ∈ X1i,j is a strategy of player i against player j, ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈
N . By denition (1)(2), this means that at stage 1 player i and player j hoose
their strategies x1i,j(z1) and x
1











The game proeeds to the seond stage with probability, whih depends on




1(z1), . . . , x
1




1(z1)) = 1 (5)
where p(z1, zk, x
1(z1)) is the probability that the game moves from initial vertex z1
to the vertex zk.
Assume that eah vertex zk ∈ F (z1) is assoiated with a matrix alled α-matrix.
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∞ 1 1 . . . 1 1
1 ∞ α1,2 . . . α1,n−1 α1,n
1 α2,1 . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 αn−1,1 . . . . . . ∞ αn−1,n
1 αn,1 . . . . . . αn,n−1 ∞


, zk ∈ F (z1)
αi,j =αj,i = 1or+∞, ∀i 6= j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
where x1(z1) are the strategies of players in the previous stage game starting from
initial vertex z1.
Denition 7. For two matries A and B with the same dimension (m × n), the




a11 . . . a1n
. . . . . .





b11 . . . b1n
. . . . . .





a11 × b11 . . . a1n × b1n
. . . . . .




The ost matrix of the stage game in the vertex zk ∈ F (z1) is dened as follows








j,i(zk)), ci0 = c0i > 0
(7)
where x2i,j(zk) ∈ X2i,j is a strategy of player i against player j, ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ N ,
zk ∈ F (z1).
Example 1. The Fig. 1 shows, how the strategy proles x1(z1) an inuene the
game played in the seond stage.
Fig. 1. The diagram of the 2-stage game with spanning tree
3. Cooperative Game
In 2-stage m..s.t. game assume that the total ost of players is the sum of the
ost of players on both stages (Parilina, 2015).
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During the game suppose that the path z′, z′′ is realized. Let xi(z
′) = x1i (z1)
and xi(z
′′) = (x2i (z2), . . . , x
2
i (zk)), i ∈ N, zk ∈ F (z1). The ooperative solution of
the game Γ (z1) for the set N
′
at the rst stage is dened as follows:
V 1(N ′, z1)
= min
x(·)













V 1(∅, z1) = 0, zk ∈ F (z1),
(8)
where p(z1, zk, x̄
1(z1)), k ∈ {k : zk ∈ F (z1)} are dened in (5), V 1(N ′, z1) is the
value of harateristi funtion for set N ′ in the game Γ (z1).
Strategies x̄i(·), i ∈ N are alled ooperative strategies, and strategy prole
x̄(·) = (x̄i(·), i ∈ N) - ooperative strategy prole.
3.1. The Value of the Game for the Player in the Game Γ (z1)
The value of the game for the player i ∈ N is dened as the value of the zero-sum
game in whih player i plays against players from N \{i}. In the zero-sum game, all
players in N \ {i} don't want to be onneted to the soure. Thus in this situation
assuming that players in N \ {i} are out and the m..s.t. ontains only one edge -
(i, 0), i ∈ N , whih means that the ost of this unique edge in eah stage game is
the ost of m..s.t. of this stage.



























where p(z1, zk, x̄





(zk) is the ost matrix restrited to {i}′ and is determined by (1) and (7).
It means that C{i}
′
(z1) and C
{i}′(zk) are sub-matries of matrix C(zk).
3.2. The Value of the Game for the Player in the Game Γ (zk)
Suppose that the subgame Γ (zk) happened in the vertex zk ∈ F (z1) of the
tree-like graph H = (Z, F ).
Aording to the denition (5), p(z1, zk, x
1(z1)) - the transition probability to
proeed from initial vertex z1 to the vertex zk. Thus, the ooperative solution of
the subgame Γ (zk) for the set N
′
at the seond stage is dened as follows:
V 2(N ′, zk) =min
x2(·)
C[Tx2(zk)(N
′, Cm(zk))] = C[Tx̄2(zk)(N
′, Cm(zk))],
V 2(∅, zk) = 0,
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where C(zk) is dened by (7). Strategies x̄
2
i (·), i ∈ N are a ooperative strategies.
Strategy prole x̄2(·) = (x̄2i (·), i ∈ N) is a ooperative strategy prole. V 2(N ′, zk)
is the value of harateristi funtion for set N ′ in the subgame Γ (zk).
In a similar way, the value of the game for the player i ∈ N is dened as following







m (zk))] = ci0,
(10)
where the subgame in the vertex zk with the probability p(z1, zk, x̄
1(z1)), zk ∈ F (z1)
whih are dened in (5), C{i}
′
(zk) is the ost matrix restrited to {i}′.
4. The Dynami Nash Bargaining Solution
Let (H1(z1), . . . , Hn(z1)) ∈ S1 be ost vetor in the game Γ (z1), the set of all
possible osts is dened as
S1 = {Hi(z1) : Hi(z1) ≥ 0, i ∈ N} (11)
and the value of the game for eah player is V 1({i}′, z1) = 2ci0, i ∈ N . Here, S1 is
bargaining set, and V 1({1}, z1), . . . , V 1({n}, z1) ∈ S1 - disagreement point.









[V 1({i}′, z1)− H̄i(z1)], i ∈ N.
Vetor (H̄1(z1), . . . , H̄n(z1)) is alled Nash bargaining solution.
At the seond stage, if the game proeeds to the stage game on the vertex
zk ∈ F (z1) with probability p(z1, zk, x̄1(z1)), the set of all possible osts is dened
as
Sk = {Hi(zk) : Hi(zk) ≥ 0, i ∈ N.} (12)









[V 2({i}′, zk)− H̄i(zk)], i ∈ N.
Time onsisteny of the ooperative solution onept was introdued for the rst
time in (Petrosyan, 2006).
Using the IDP (Imputation Distribution Proedure) the Dynami Nash Bar-
gaining Solution is onstruted (Junnan, 2018).
Denition 8. Imputation distribution proedure of the Nash Bargaining Solution





1(z1))H̄i(zk), ∀i ∈ N
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Fig. 2. The gure on the left side is the tree-like graph of the game. The gure on the





1(z1))H̄i(zk), ∀i ∈ N,
where p(z1, zk, x̄
1(z1)) is the transition probability from the initial stage to the stage
game Γ (zk), zk ∈ F (z1).
Denition 9. The Nash Bargaining SolutionHi(z1), i ∈ N is alled time onsistent
in the game with spanning tree, if there exists a nonnegative IDP (β1i ≥ 0, β2i ≥












2, ∀i ∈ N, (14)
where p(z1, zk, x̄
1(z1)) is the transition probability from the initial stage to the stage
game Γ (zk), zk ∈ F (z1).
Unfortunately, in 2-stage m..s.t. games the IDP β may take negative value.
Proposition 1. Construted above IDP β for the Dynami Nash Bargaining Solu-
tion (H̄1(z1), . . . , H̄n(z1)) is time inonsistent.
We propose a ounterexample in order to verify the proposition.
Example 2. In this example, we onsider a two-person game with spanning tree as
an illustration in Fig.2.
The set of players is N = {1, 2}, and the soure is {0}, N ′ = N ∪ {0}. The sets
of strategies, whih player 1 uses against player 2, are X11,2 = {3, 4}, X21,2 = {6, 7},
and the sets of strategy, whih player 2 uses against player 1, are X12,1 = {6, 2},
X22,1 = {8, 3}. Assume that there are two vertexes z2, z3 following after the initial
vertex z1 in the game . The tree-like graph as shown in Fig.2 on the left side.
As shown in Fig.2, in eah stage there is a graph over N ′. Assume that edges
(0, 1), (0, 2) are xed and the ost of edges are c01 = c10 = 80, c02 = c20 = 10. The
funtion fc is dened as fc = x1,2 × x2,1, x1,2 ∈ X1,2, x2,1 ∈ X2,1.


















where x1i (z1) ∈ X1i is the strategy prole of players in the rst stage, i ∈ N .
In the ase of dierent strategy proles of players, the game's transition proba-
bilities are
x1(z1) = (3, 6) : p(z1, z2, x
1(z1)) = 0.5, p(z1, z3, x
1(z1)) = 0.5,
x1(z1) = (3, 7) : p(z1, z2, x
1(z1)) = 0.7, p(z1, z3, x
1(z1)) = 0.3,
x1(z1) = (4, 6) : p(z1, z2, x
1(z1)) = 0.9, p(z1, z3, x
1(z1)) = 0.1,
x1(z1) = (4, 7) : p(z1, z2, x
1(z1)) = 0.15, p(z1, z3, x
1(z1)) = 0.85.
Aording to above-mentioned analysis, in 2-stage game we get the value of the
game for eah player in the game Γ (z1):
V 1({1}′, z1) = 160, V 1({2}′, z1) = 20
The value of the game for eah player in the the subgame Γ (z2):
V 2({1}′, z2) = 80, V 1({2}′, z2) = 10
The value of the game for eah player in the the subgame Γ (z3):
V 2({1}′, z3) = 80, V 1({2}′, z3) = 10
The value of harateristi funtion for set N ′ in the game Γ (z1):
V 1(N ′, z1) = 57.4
The Nash bargaining solution in the game Γ (z1),
H̄1(z1) = 57.4, H̄2(z1) = 0
The Nash bargaining solution in the game Γ (z2),
H̄1(z2) = 16, H̄2(z2) = 0
The Nash bargaining solution in the game Γ (z3),











1(z1)) = 0.9, p(z1, z3, x̄
1(z1)) = 0.1
We onstrut IDP β for the Dynami Nash Bargaining Solution,
β12 = H̄2 (z1)− p (z1, z2) H̄2 (z1)− p (z1, z3) H̄2 (z3)
= 0− 0.9× 0− 0.1× 10 = −1 ≤ 0
The Dynami Nash Bargaining Solution in the example is time inonsistent.
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5. Results
Theorem 1. If in a 2-stage game with spanning tree Γ (z1), the following onditions
hold
H̄i(z1) ≥ H̄i(zk), ∀i ∈ N (15)
then, the Dynami Nash Bargaining Solution (H̄1(z1), . . . , H̄n(z1)) is time onsis-
tent.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the denition of β1 and β2.






p(z1, zk, x̄(z1))H̄i(z1) ≥ p(z1, zk, x̄(z1))H̄i(zk),
zk ∈ F (z1), ∀i ∈ N
thus ∑
zk∈F (z1)




zk ∈ F (z1), ∀i ∈ N
then
H̄i(z1) ≥ β2i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N
and
β1i = H̄i(z1)− β2i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N
the theorem is proved ⊓⊔
Referenes
Li, Yin (2016). The dynami Shapley Value in the game with spanning tree. Stability and
Osillations of Nonlinear Control Systems (Pyatnitskiy's Conferene). 2016 Interna-
tional Conferene. IEEE. pp. 14.
Bird, C.G. (1976). On ost alloation for a spanning tree: a game theoreti approah.
Networks, 6(4), 335350.
Horn, R.A., Johnson, C. R. (2012). Matrix analysis. Cambridge university press.
Petrosyan, L. (2006). Cooperative stohasti games. Advanes in dynami games,
Birkhauser Boston, 139145.
Junnan, J. (2018). Dynami Nash Bargaining Solution for two-stage network games. Con-
tributions to Game Theory and Management, 11(0), 6672.
Parilina, E.M. Stable ooperation in stohasti games. Autom Remote Control, 76, 1111
1122.
Granot, D., Huberman, G. (1981). Minimum ost spanning tree games. Mathematial pro-
gramming, 21(1), 118.
Petrosyan, L.A. (1977). Stability of the Solutions of Dierential Games with Several Play-
ers. Vestnik of the Leningrad State University, 19, 4652.
